Sunday, January 4, 2009

Epistemology III - Post-Modernism

Post-modernism's epistemology and its effects are in many ways less clear than those of modernism to the average person in Western society. There are probably multiple reasons, among them:
  • It is a more recent development,

  • It encompasses developments in several areas ("post" simply means "after"), and

  • Its epistemology is grounded largely in a recent (and relatively opaque) linguistic theory...not the sort of thing kids read about in middle school (unlike the scientific method).
At the risk of fatal oversimplification, I'll define post-modernism (as an epistemology) as follows:

The understanding that
  • knowledge is ultimately shaped by and grounded in language,

  • language both reflects and reinforces existing power structures, and

  • the key task of the knower is to deconstruct the existing assumptions and power structures seen in a text.

Note that the task of the knower is largely de-structive (vs. the con-structive activity engaged by the modern knower), though via a specified process.

This has various implications:
  • All knowledge is subjective, relative, narrative, and specific to a time, place, and individual knower,

  • All language and knowledge claims are best seen as attempts to exert power,

  • All claims to objective universal knowledge are attempts to oppress others.

Although this summary is may be closer to parody than reality (or maybe it's closer to a deconstructed post-modernism), I think it's a reasonable summary for purposes of thinking about its influence on epistemology.

In the area of general revelation, even the hardest of modern science is seen by some as socially constructed, and therefore relative (not objective). In the popular arena, this critique finds a sympathetic hearing among those who see technology (being grounded in math, physics, and chemistry) as inherently oppressive. More broadly, claims to universally knowable objective knowledge of any type, much less about the metaphysical and God, are dismissed.

In the area of special revelation, the Bible is seen as just another text whose traditional reading and understanding simply reflects another place and time. Therefore, traditional understandings should be, a priori, rejected as attempts to impose the perspectives and values (a relatively new term) of another place and time on a current place and time. Traditional liberal Protestantism rejected miracles; postmodern Protestantism rejects doctrines (assertions of universal Truth) and is generally suspicious of any text that does not align with an amorphous definition of "tolerance." Regardless, it seems that modern and postmodern approaches to Christianity are reaching roughly the same conclusions about required/desired individual and corporate behavior.

If modernism is sometimes encourages in the broader culture an "easy believism" (17,400 hits in Google), post-modernism would seem to encourage what might be called "easy skepticism" (352 hits in Google). Most of us have been indoctrinated about such dangers as appeals to authority and the limits of reason. On the other hand, most of us have thought little (if any) about the dangers of acting on uninformed emotion since "everyone knows that knowledge is subjective and relative"(and is therefore not worth pursuing).

Since the culture we live in is mostly post-modern, it would seem that the primary danger Christians face from it is a tendency to either (a) not pursue a knowledge of the Bible's text, or (b) to apply a sophisticated linguistic theory that distorts the plain meaning of the text (e.g., by emphasizing what is different between a current context and the context of the original text, instead of discerning the meaning conveyed by the text that is universal across all contexts).

4 comments:

  1. Taking a literary theory course this past fall, I was certainly steeped in the sorts of post-modern linguistics you mention in this post.

    The claim of most of the French schools --Deconstruction in particular-- that all knowing is really hermeneutics, that all facts must be interpreted, seemed to make a lot of sense to me. From conversations we've had and this post, I think you would mostly disagree with this assertion.

    Without saying that I accept it with no reservations, I wanted to see what your response to it is. Can we actually "know" without interpreting? If not, whence should we derive our method for interpretation?

    Like I said, I have my own qualms about wholeheartedly agreeing with Derrida and his ilk, but I have trouble getting around this particular point.

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  2. Sorry so slow on moderating...I've been too busy to login for days (a week or more?).

    I suspect we're more in violent agreement than quiet disagreement.

    Postmodernism provided a needed corrective to the excesses of modernism. However, it seems to have gone to the opposite extreme...from modernism's enthroning of logic and empiricism as a path to sure and total knowledge to postmodernism's understanding that all assertion of objective "knowledge" is fundamentally the exercise of power.

    My concern is that neither extreme reflects either (a) the created order, or (b) the way people live in the real world.

    Language is a medium, and an imperfect and incomplete one. So, it's no surprise that our knowing is imperfect and incomplete. As I mentioned above, PM has been very helpful in correcting modernism's pretensions about the possibility of perfect and complete knowledge. However, the opposite extreme of seeing meaning grounded (vs. mediated) in language and therefore no more than an arbitrary social construct seems equally pretentious.

    You have touched on a core challenge when dealing with any philosopher of significance. By definition (i.e., being significant), their thought is almost always complex and nuanced. Popular interpretations almost always simplify that thought to the point of being misleading. I'm not so much interested here in the details of Derrida, et.al. as I am with the popular interpretation/ application of that thought, since that's what gets woven into the culture.

    I've not read widely across various popular interpretations in this area, but I'd recommend D. A. Carson's "Becoming Conversant With The Emerging Church." It seems fairly balanced to me (though a cursory Google search will reveal lots of folks who don't think so).

    As you may have noticed, I have also read Carl Raschke's "The Next Reformation" (subtitled "Why Evangelicals Must Embrace Postmodernity"). I have to say I found it much less balanced (i.e., much more polemical), and much less convincing (actually, I think Carson makes a better case for PM's value than Raschke).

    I think of a Biblical worldview as being pre-modern, if a label has to be given...modernism took the Christian understanding of a God who revealed himself in an understandable and coherent fashion and made it an idol. PM has taken the skeptical reaction against modernism and made it an idol.

    If we are created in God's image, and we are fallen, then it seems to me that we can know that some things are objectively true (or at the very least, we will be forced to ACT as if they are), but that are knowledge is always understood as imperfect and incomplete. And, we're often unclear on exactly where those imperfect/incomplete areas are.

    In this area, as in any discussion of knowledge, I think it's important to maintain its link to action. If knowledge isn't linked ultimately to action in some way, I'm much more likely to view it as of secondary importance.

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  3. Two things:

    1) I remember you mentioning Carson this summer, so I was interested when, in Living World Religions, Monte Cox mentioned that he studied under Carson during his graduate work. I thought of you when he said it.

    2) I'm sorry if you feel like your first comment addressed this specific question, but I'm still a little fuzzy on my own and your thoughts on it. Assuming that there are parts of knowledge or truth that are up for interpretation rather than able to be absolutely known in any sort of empirical sense, how should we interpret those? Maybe better stated, from whence do we derive our hermeneutical or interpretive strategy?

    I'll also pose it more specifically: say, in studying the Bible, is there an ultimate hermeneutic for discerning its truth? Or, does the mere concession that truth can, at times (not necessarily all times), be a little fuzzy preclude the existence of any "correct" or "true" interpretation?

    I'm afraid that's not clear enough... I think it's the best I can do for now. Maybe if you have a problem understanding what I'm trying to ask, you can ask me a question or two to clear it up.

    Thanks, Walt!

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  4. Regarding "ultimate hermeneutic" (a phrase that sounds more than a little Modern) ... I tried to capture my opinion in the "Epistemology I - How Do We Know?"

    The primary reason I discussed Modernism and Post-Modernism is that they inevitably bleed into such a discussion. As I stated before, I think either extreme runs the risk of thinking we can put God in a box (Modernism) or creating a God that is "totally other" (at least a little PM in such a perspective).

    Remind me sometime to show you an opinion piece called "Matrix Mindsets." It's from the IT domain, and discusses how engineers always want to fit the universe into a matrix. The upshot is that we have a tendency to take the knowledge tools we know the best (or think are the "coolest") and try to fit the universe into them. I see it all the time in the workplace.

    That's why when it comes to the Bible, I tend to be a bit of an anti-intellectual...and refer to passages like I Cor 1-2. And, I look at how Jesus (in conveying knowledge to the disciples) wove narrative and proposition together to change hearts and actions.

    Which brings up a thought: are the narratives in the Letters (which we tend to think of as being largely propositional/doctrinal) the context to which they were being written? (Hebrews being a bit of an outlier...)

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